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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
PACER SPORT & CYCLE, INC.,
Respondent-Plaintiff,
vs.
FRANK MYERS and
CARL W. MYERS,
Appellant-Defendant.

Case No.
13839

RESPONDENTS BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action wherein the appellant seeks a reversal of an order denying their motion to set aside
a default judgment.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Third District Court, Judge Gordon R. Hall,
entered default judgment against appellant. The Third
District Court, Judge M. D. Jones, Judge Pro Tem, denied
the motion of appellant to set aside the default judgment.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the order denying his
motion to set aside a default judgment.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The appellant, Carl W. Myers, will hereinafter be
referred to as "Carl Myers". Reference to Frank C. Myers
will be "Frank Myers." The respondent, Pacer Sport &
Cycle, will hereafter be referred to as "Pacer Cycle".
The Statement of Facts set forth in Carl Myers' brief
present an entirely different case to this Court than was
presented to the trial court. There are few citations to
the record because very few of the facts recited in Carl
Myers* brief are in the record.
Carl Myers' Statement of Facts centers around the
claim that Pacer Cycle agreed to furnish Frank Myers with
free motorcycles. Such an agreement is denied by Pacer
Cycle and is inconsistent with the Sales Contract and Security Agreement (R. 49). Pacer Cycle had agreed to
provide free labor involved in the service or repair of the
motorcycle (exclusive of parts) and stood ready to perform such agreement at all times. However, Frank Myers
did not take advantage of the free repair agreement because he was delinquent in paying for the motorcycle and
therefore avoided all contact with Pacer Cycle.
It is interesting to note that although Carl Myers
argues the existence of agreement whereby the motorcycle
was to be given to Frank Myers without charge, he is unwilling to state under oath in his Affidavit that such an
agreement existed. Nowhere in his Affidavit does he
state the existence of an agreement that the motorcycle
would be given to Frank without charge. This is because
such an agreement never existed.
2
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The total record supporting the allegation that the
motorcycle was to be given to Frank without charge, consists of self serving allegations of such an agreement made
by Carl Myers to counsel for Pacer Cycle after the default
judgment was taken (R. 35-36). The alleged agreement
was never mentioned at the time of demand for payment
of the sales contract (R. 34-35) or at the time of service of
summons (R. 35).
Frank Myers' version of the facts has expanded during
each phase of this proceeding. The present version of the
facts bears no similarity whatsoever to other versions
stated on previous occasions in this proceeding.
Prior to the filing of the Complaint in this action,
counsel for Pacer Cycle sent a demand letter to Carl Myers.
In response to that letter Carl Myers contacted the attorney for Pacer Cycle and stated that he would not pay the
obligation since all of the benefits were realized by his
son, Frank. (R. 34) On this occasion there was no mention of any agreement whereby Pacer Cycle was to furnish
free motorcycles to Frank Myers. On the contrary, Carl
Myers admitted that his signature was necessary in order
to obtain credit on behalf of his son (R. 34-35).
After service of summons and Complaint on Carl
Myers, he again contacted counsel for Pacer Cycle. On
this occasion he was specifically informed that if he did
not file an answer to the Complaint a default judgment
would be taken against him which would be executed
against his property (R. 35). He replied that he would
not answer a complaint dealing with an obligation that
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was primarily that of his son, Frank (R. 35). He was instructed to contact an attorney and respond to the Complaint and was given every opportunity to ask any questions concerning the procedure to protect himself against
a judgment (R. 35). There was no mention of any agreement whereby Pacer Cycle was to furnish free motorcycles to his son. Rather, the emphasis was on the fact that
his son was the one obligated under the contract and that
by reason thereof the son should bear the responsibility
(R. 35). There was some mention during this conversation
that Pacer Cycle had agreed to provide free service and
repair on the motorcycle, but no mention of any arrangement for free motorcycles (R. 35).
After the entry of default judgment, counsel for Pacer
Cycle again contacted Carl Myers to advise him of the default judgment. This was the first time Carl Myers ever
claimed the existence of an agreement whereby Pacer
Cycle was to furnish free motorcycles to Frank Myers. The
alleged agreement has always been denied by Pacer Cycle
and is inconsistent with the provisions of the Sales contract (R. 49).
None of these conversations with counsel for Pacer
Cycle were denied or questioned by Carl Myers in his
Affidavit filed with the trial court (R. 37-38).
The second claim of Carl Myers is that he thought the
telephone conversations was a sufficient answer to the
Complaint. The summons which was served on Carl
Myers specifically informed him that it was necessary to
file an answer "in writing with the clerk of the court" (R.
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45). In addition, during a telephone conversation with
counsel for Pacer Cycle he was again informed that he
was obligated to file an answer to the Complaint (R. 35).
On the basis of this information, it is impossible for him
to reasonably conclude that the telephone conversation
itself was an answer to the Complaint since during that
conversation he stated that he refused to answer (R. 35).
During this same conversation he was further informed
of the consequences of not filing an answer: that a default
judgment would be taken against him which could be
satisfied by execution upon his property (R. 35). This telephone conversation was prior to the expiration of the time
for filing an answer, and long before a default judgment
was taken.
Carl Myers complains that the delay of one year between service of summons and default judgment in some
way justifies setting the default judgment aside. The
reason for the delay arose by reason of attempts by Pacer
Cycle and its assignee to locate Frank Myers and the
collateral. As will be noted later, the collateral was dismantled and the parts located have a mechanics' lien
against them. Frank Myers has never been located. The
answer to the Complaint on behalf of Frank Myers was
filed without service of summons upon him and after default judgment had been taken against his father, Carl
Myers.
If anything, the delay in taking default judgment is
further evidence of the absence of excusable neglect since
it gave Carl Myers every opportunity to respond and assert
any defenses at a proper stage of the proceedings.
5
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ARGUMENT
POINT

I.

DENIAL OF APPELLANTS MOTION TO SET
ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT WAS WITHIN SOUND DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL
COURT.
The only provisions of law justifying the setting
aside of the default judgment are contained in Rule 60 (b)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. These rules provide
for relief from a final judgment for reasons of "Mistake,
inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect" or "any other
reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment."
It is apparent from the uncontroverted facts, that
none of these grounds exist in the instant case. For this
reason, the denial of the motion to set aside the judgment
was a proper exercise of the discretion of the trial court.
Since Carl Myers was specifically informed as to his
obligation to provide a written answer to the Complaint,
was correctly advised as to the consequences in failing to
act, and was given ample time in which to act, there are
no grounds whatsoever to reasonably argue that his failure
to answer was by reason of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect or any other reason which would
justify relief from the judgment. Carl Myers had every
opportunity to present any meritorious defense and willfully and knowingly refused to answer.
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4

The sole excuse for failing to answer the Complaint
is the claim that Carl Myers considered the telephone conversation with attorney for Pacer Cycle as constituting the
court answer. (R. 37). If this constitutes neglect, it is far
from "excusable neglect," since during the course of that
conversation Carl Myers was informed that a formal
answer was required and he specifically stated that he
refused to make such an answer (R. 35). Having refused
to answer, he cannot reasonably contend that he deemed
the conversation to constitute an answer. Since he specifically refused to take any action, he could not have assumed
that the action was already being taken. Willful conduct
cannot constitute "neglect." It follows with even greater
force that willful conduct cannot constitute "excusable
neglect."
The situation involved in the instant case is similar
to that involved in Board of Education v. Cox, 14 Utah
2d 385, 384 P.2d 806 (1963). In that case the defendant
claimed he failed to answer the Complaint because he was
of the opinion that it was invalid because it had not been
signed by the trial judge. This Court upheld the action of
the trial court in refusing to set aside the default judgment. The basis of the decision was as follows:
"The trial judge was in an advantaged position to judge the defendant's creditability. In view
of his interest, the court was not obliged to believe
the somewhat feeble excuse he gave him for not
paying attention to the summons: that he thought
it required a judge's signature. The summons is
self explanatory to anyone who can read, and this
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excuse is so unrealistic that the trial judge was not
compelled to accept it . . . In view of these facts
the trial court's conclusion that Mr. Cox's failure
to heed the summons was his deliberate choice does
not seem unreasonable." {Emphasis added]
In the instant case, the summons clearly states that
the answer must be in writing (R. 45). So, as in the Cox
case, a conclusion to the contrary is unreasonable and
therefore does not constitute excusable neglect. The instant
case is a much more flagrant disregard of the obligation
to answer since, unlike the Cox case, the defendant in this
case was specifically told of his obligation and clearly
stated his deliberate intention not to respond to the summons.
If illness is not excusable neglect, Warren v. Dixon
Ranch Co., 123 Utah 416, 260 P.2d 741 (1953), certainly
knowingly refusing to answer a Complaint does not constitute excusable neglect. Moreover, it has been specifically held that where notice of intent to take default
judgment is communicated to the adverse party prior to
taking the judgment, there is no claim for excusable neglect. Masters v. LeSeuer, 13 Utah 2d 293, 373 P.2d 573
(1962).
The question is one presented to the discretion of the
trial judge, and will be set aside only if there is a clear
abuse of discretion. Chrysler v. Chrysler, 5 Utah 2d 415,
303 P.2d 995 (1956); Masters v. LeSeuer supra; Mayheiv v.
Standard Gilsonite Co., 14 Utah 2d 52, 376 P.2d 951
(1962). The facts before the court give no basis for a
8
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finding that the trial court abused its discretion in
these circumstances. It is apparent that the trial court
found that Carl Myers willfully and knowingly refused to
answer the Complaint after being fully advised of his
obligation to do so and the consequences thereof. This
court will not substitute its discretion for that of the trial
court. Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 123 Utah 416, 260 P.2d
741(1953).
On page 6 of his brief, Carl Myers argues that Pacer
Cycle's attorney admits a valid dispute between the parties.
A reading of the Affidavit of Pacer's attorney illustrates
that the argument is taken out of context. The statement
was made to demonstrate the nature in which Carl Myers
version of the facts expands with the passage of time and
not as an admission of a valid issue between the parties.
Carl Myers further argues that by reason of alleged
valid disputes, the judgment should be set aside. Pacer
asserts that the time for asserting valid disputes or defenses has long since past and Carl Myers was given every
opportunity to assert the defenses at a proper state of the
proceeding. By asserting the claimed defenses at this
point in time he is merely carrying forth his original plan to willfully and knowingly delay the proceedings and respond at his own convenience.

POINT

II.

THERE WAS N O VIOLATION OF LAW IN
REFUSING TO SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT
JUDGMENT.
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Under point II of his brief, Myers again attempts to
assert defenses which should have been asserted in the
answer which he willfully refused to file. There are two
errors in this argument:
(a) The proper time for asserting defenses noted in
Myers' brief have long since past. The sole issue before
the court is whether the default should be set aside, not
an argument of the merits of the case;
(b) Myers argument is based not only upon facts not
in the record, but upon facts which are totally false.
(a)

Sole issue is discretion of Trial Court

It is the clear intent of the Rules of Procedure to require defendant to assert any defenses in the trial court.
Carl Myers has willfully refused to assert his defenses at
the proper stage of the proceeding and now seeks to assert
them for the first time to this Court after judgment.
The issue to be determined is not the validity of the
defenses but whether the trial court abused its discretion
in refusing to set aside a default judgment after a finding
that the defendant has willfully refused to answrer the
Complaint after being put on notice that default judgment
would be taken and the consequences of such a judgment.
This Court has clearly held that in reviewing an order
refusing to set aside a default judgment, the only considerations are the facts and circumstances surrounding the
failure to answer. The court will not review the merits of
the case:
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"We are concerned only with why he did not
answer, not with what kind of answer would he
give if he were so inclined. This latter question
arises only after consideration of the first question
and a sufficient excuse therefrom being shown.
Board of Education v. Cox, 14 Utah 2d 385, 384
P.2d 806 (1963) [emphasis added].
(b)

Defenses are based on a false set of facts

The main import of Myers' brief centers around a
wrongful repossession of the motorcycle. It seems odd that
Carl Myers would rely on facts that he is unwilling to
verify under oath. Nowhere in his Affidavit, or in any
other affidavit, was there any statement that a repossession had ever taken place.
The only evidence of a repossession is at R. 50. The
document (R. 50) was prepared in March, 1973 on erroneous information that the motorcycle had been repossessed
in January, 1973. However, after checking the facts it
was discovered that the repossession was of another motorcycle possessed by another buyer. For this reason, the
document at R. 50 was never notarized and was included
*!>e Complaint by error. The document is not referred to at all in the Complaint.
Since Myers never raised the repossession argument
in the trial court, Pacer Cycle had no opportunity or reason
to clarify the question of whether a repossession had taken
place.
In order to avoid expending time and effort of the
Court on the basis of a misunderstanding of the facts,
Pacer Cycle has obtained Affidavits from the persons in11
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volved on the question of repossession. If Pacer Cycle's
motion to supplement the record under Rule 75 (h), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, is granted, Affidavits stating
that no repossession ever took place will be on file with
the Court. The Affidavits establish that neither Pacer
Cycle nor its assignee, Zions Bank, or any other person has
ever repossessed the motorcycle involved. The motorcycle
has been dismantled and there is a mechanics' lien against
the parts that have been located.
CONCLUSION
The sole issue before the Court is whether the circumstances surrounding the defendant's failure to answer
constitute excusable neglect. The affidavits submitted by
Pacer Cycle set forth these facts and they are not questioned or controverted by Carl Myers' Affidavit. These
facts demonstrate that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in finding there was no excusable neglect justifying the defendant's refusal to answer.
Respectfully submitted,
rWALEK^XHOLBROOK
8c MCDONOUGH \
*

By
jbert M. McDonald
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